2013 USMEX Associates Conference

The purpose of this two-day conference was to promote discussion and dissemination of some of the most promising new scholarship on Mexico, bringing together young scholars to present their work, and have it commented on and discussed by faculty within the network of USMEX Associates. It was also an opportunity for USMEX Associates to connect with each other and have the opportunity to share their scholarship with other Mexico scholars in the UC campus-wide system. In addition, a roundtable discussion focused on the recent comparisons in the general media and policy debates between Mexico and China.

Young scholars presented at each panel with a USMEX Associates as discussants.

See below for abstracts and/or presentations.

Click Here for Speaker and Discussant Bios

Agenda

THURSDAY, APRIL 25, 2013
Location: UC San Diego Campus, Institute of the Americas, Weaver Center

12:45 – 1:00pm | Welcoming Remarks

1:00 – 3:30pm | Panel 1: “Political Economy of Land Distribution and the Mexican State”

Discussants: Alain de Janvry, UC Berkeley and Emilio Kouri, University of Chicago

“Path Dependence in Development: Evidence from the Mexican Revolution” [Abstract]
Melissa Dell, Harvard University

“Monitoring Political Brokers: Evidence from Clientelistic Networks in Mexico” [Presentation]
Horacio Larreguy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

“The Politics of Ejidal Credit and Debt in the Comarca Lagunera”
Nicole Mottier, University of Chicago

3:30 – 4:00pm | Break

4:00 – 6:00pm | UC Associates Roundtable Discussion – “Is Mexico the New China?”

Panelists:
Alberto Díaz-Cayeros, UC San Diego; Lei Guang, UC San Diego; Marco Morales, New York University

Overview: When it comes to cheap manufacturing and trade advantages due to geographic proximity to the U.S. market, Mexico is re-emerging as a key player in the global economy. This roundtable discussion will look closely at the economic fundamentals and examine if Mexico is going to be the “new” China.

6:00 – 7:00pm | Reception
FRIDAY, APRIL 26, 2013
Location: UC San Diego Campus, RIMAC Annex, Dugout Conference Room

9:00am – 11:00am | Panel 2: “Violence, State Authority and the Challenge of Governance”
Discussants: Tonatiuh Guillén, El Colegio de la Frontera Norte and Beatriz Magaloni, Stanford University

“Agricultural Shocks, Crime and the Drug Trade in Mexico” [Abstract]
Oeindrila Dube, New York University

“Choosing between Corruption and Violence: A Survey on Drug-War Violence and Political Behavior in Mexico” [Abstract]
Omar García Ponce, New York University

“Support for Torture: Experimental Evidence from the Mexican War on Drugs”
Javier Osorio, University of Notre Dame

11:00 – 11:15am | Break

11:15am – 12:30pm | Panel 3: “Territoriality of Violence”
Discussants: Vidal Romero, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México and David Shirk, University of San Diego

“The Economic Consequences of Violence in Mexico”
Gabriela Calderón, Stanford University

“The Spatial Variation of the Initial Conditions of Crime Prevention Programs” [Abstract and Presentation]
Carlos Vilalta, CIDE

12:30 – 1:00pm | Lunch

1:00 – 2:15pm | Panel 4: “Urban Spaces and Tensions in the Social Fabric”
Discussants: Rolando Cordera, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México and Exequiel Ezcurra, UC Riverside

“Urban Sociality and Youth Networks: Thickening the Social Fabric Through Grassroots Activism in Oaxaca”
Maurice Magaña, University of Oregon

“Two Types of Traffic in Tijuana: The Generalization of Accident” [Abstract]
Rihan Yeh, Colegio de Michoacán

2:15 – 2:30pm | Closing Remarks
Gabriela Calderón

Gabriela Calderón has a Ph.D. in Economics from Stanford University. She is currently a post-doctoral fellow at the Center for Democracy, Development and Rule of Law at Stanford University and a researcher with the Poverty and Governance Program. She received her master’s degree in economic theory and bachelor’s degree in economics at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México. Her current research with the Program on Poverty and Governance analyzes the causes and consequences of drug-trafficking related violence. Her research has focused on the topics of development, public finance, and the evaluation of public policy programs in Mexico. In particular, she has focused on the ways policies from the government and non-profit organizations shape the labor decisions, and more general, the development process in a country.

Alberto Díaz-Cayeros

Alberto Díaz-Cayeros is an Associate Professor of International Relations and Pacific Studies at UC San Diego and Director of the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies (USMEX). He is affiliated with the Center for Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law (CDDRL), the Stanford Center for International Development (SCID), and is a member of the board of the Center for Latin American Studies. His current research interests include poverty, development, federalism, clientelism and patronage, and Mexico. His book “Federalism, Fiscal Authority and Centralization in Latin America” compares the evolution of Mexican fiscal centralization in the 20th century with Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. He is currently working on a book manuscript entitled “Strategies of Vote Buying: Social Transfers, Democracy and Welfare in Mexico” (with Federico Estévez and Beatriz Magaloni).

Rolando Cordera

Rolando Cordera is Emeritus Professor of the Economics School at the National Autonomous University of Mexico and the Chairman of the University Program of Development Studies. He was awarded the degree of Doctor Honoris Causa by the Autonomous Metropolitan University and is a member of the Mexican National Researchers System Level II. He is the author of several books, including “Mexico the Dispute of the Nation 2nd Edition” (with co-author Carlos Tello), “Towards a New Path of Development”, and “The Roll of Ideas and Policies in the Structural Change in Mexico.” He is also a columnist for the newspaper La Jornada and chairman of the Configuraciones review.

Melissa Dell

Melissa Dell is a Junior Fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows and an associate of the Harvard Economics Department. She is also a Global Scholar in the Institutions, Organizations and Growth program at the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research and a faculty research fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research. She holds a Ph.D. in economics from MIT, a bachelor’s degree summa cum laude from Harvard University and an M. Phil. with Distinction from the University of Oxford, where she was a Rhodes Scholar. Melissa’s research focuses on the interplay between the state, non-state actors, and economic development. She seeks to understand why poverty and insecurity persist and examines how reforms to strengthen the state influence economic outcomes. In particular, she has examined the relationship between government crackdowns and drug violence in Mexico, as well as the persistence of poverty in Mexico and Peru.

Oeindrila Dube

Oeindrila Dube is an Assistant Professor of politics and economics at New York University. She holds a Ph.D. in Public Policy from Harvard University, a M.Phil in Economics from the University of Oxford, and a B.A. in Public Policy from Stanford University. In her research, she has analyzed how factors such as commodity prices, foreign aid, and weapons inflows have affected democracy and conflict outcomes in Mexico and Colombia. She also assesses the impact of institution building programs, such as post-conflict reconciliation efforts, through the use of experimental methods.
Exequiel Ezcurra obtained a Ph.D. at the University College of North Wales, studying the vegetation, climate, and hydrology of the Gran Desierto in Northern Mexico. Since then he has oriented his research towards the ecology of coastal deserts, ocean-land interactions, and conservation biology in the Sea of Cortés. As research director at the San Diego Natural History Museum he developed the scientific script of the giant-screen nature film “Ocean Oasis,” which won the 2001 Jackson Hole Nature Film Award and the 2002 BBC Wildscreen Award, and developed three successful exhibits on the natural history of Baja California, the Sea of Cortés, and Southern California. Currently, he is the Director of the University of California Institute for Mexico and the United States (UC MEXUS) and Professor of Ecology at the University of California, Riverside, and adjunct faculty at Scripps Institution of Oceanography.

Lei Guang is the founding Director of the 21st Century China Program. Prior to joining UC San Diego, he was Professor of Political Science at San Diego State University where he also directed the University’s Center for Asian and Pacific Studies from 2009-2011. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities. He is currently working on projects that seek to understand the causes of social conflict in China (and India), and responses by the grassroots states. His scholarly publications have appeared in numerous volumes and journals such as Politics & Society, International Migration Review, Critical Asian Studies, Pacific Review, Journal of Contemporary China, China Quarterly, and Modern China. He also serves on the editorial board of China Quarterly and the China Journal.

Tonatiuh Guillén has a PhD. in Social Sciences with specialty on Sociology. He is currently the President of El Colegio de la Frontera Norte (2012-2017), where he has also been Director of the Public Administration Department and Director of the academic journal Frontera Norte. He has been professor at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Universidad Autónoma de Coahuila, and the Universidad Autónoma de Chiapas; he has also been visiting scholar at other national and international universities. His research focuses on regional politics, local government innovation, federalism and decentralization. He is member of the Mexican National System of Researchers, a distinction awarded only to the best national scholars, and member of the National Academy of Science of Mexico and the Advisory Board of Science and Technology. He is currently the President of the Advisory Council of the Research Centers of the Mexican Council of Science and Technology.

Alain de Janvry is an agricultural economist working on international economic development with expertise on agriculture and rural development. He is a professor of Agriculture and Resource Economics and of Public Policy at the University of California at Berkeley. He was the co-director of the World Bank’s World Development Report 2008 on Agriculture for Development. He is a member of the French National Academy of Agriculture and a fellow of the American Agricultural Economic Association.

Emilio Kouri is a professor of Latin American History and of Romance Languages and Literatures at the University of Chicago, where he serves as Director of the Katz Center for Mexican Studies and Chair of the Department of Romance Languages and Literatures. He is the author of “A Pueblo Divided: Business, Property, and Community in Papantla, Mexico” (Stanford University Press, 2004), which won the 2005 Bolton-Johnson Prize awarded by the Conference on Latin American History. He is the editor of two volumes of essays, “En busca de Molina Enríquez: Cien años de Los grandes problemas nacionales” and (with Javier Garcia diego) “Revolución y exilio en la historia de México” (México, 2010).

Horacio Larreguy is currently finishing his a Ph.D. in Economics at MIT. In July, he will join the Department of Government at Harvard University as an Assistant Professor. He received his B.Sc. in Economics from the University of Buenos Aires in Argentina, and his M.Sc. in Economics and Finance from the Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros in Spain. Among his fields of interest are political economy and economic development.
Beatriz Magaloni
Beatriz Magaloni is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University, and a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, where she directs the Program on Poverty and Governance. She pursues a research agenda focused on governance, poverty reduction, electoral clientelism, the provision of public goods and criminal violence. Her first book, “Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico” (2006, Cambridge University Press) won the Best Book Award from the Comparative Democratization Section of the American Political Science Association and the 2007 Leon Epstein Award for the Best Book published in the previous two years in the area of political parties and organizations. Her second book, “Strategies of Vote Buying: Democracy, Clientelism, and Poverty Relief in Mexico” (co-authored with Alberto Díaz-Cayeros and Federico Estévez) studies the politics of poverty relief.

Maurice Rafael Magaña
Maurice Rafael Magaña is a Ph.D. candidate in Sociocultural Anthropology in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Oregon. He received his MA in Anthropology from the University of Oregon in 2008 and his BA in Anthropology from the University of South Florida in 2003. Maurice’s current research examines the local political culture of autonomous youth activism in Oaxaca, Mexico and considers how urban youth are experimenting with novel forms of social and political participation in the present context of economic, social and political uncertainty. While at the University of Oregon, he has worked as a research assistant for the Center for Latino/a and Latin American Studies, and the Center for the Study of Woman in Society’s “Latinos in Rural Oregon” and “Gender, Families and Immigration in the Northwest” research initiatives.

Marco Morales
Marco Morales is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at New York University. He received a BA in Political Science from Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM). His current research focuses on refining the tools that have traditionally been used to measure and model economic voting, both at the individual and at the aggregate levels. He served as Director General for Political Analysis for the Communications Coordinator and Federal Government Spokeswoman at the Office of the Mexican Presidency, and as Spokesman for the Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations during the country’s most recent tenure as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Nicole Mottier
Nicole Mottier is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History at the University of Chicago. Her dissertation examines ejidal credit, the agrarian reform, informality and peasants’ lives in Mexico during the first part of the twentieth century. Her work has been supported by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the Fulbright-Hays Program and the University of Chicago Visiting Committee. She has several publications and has taught numerous courses on Latin American history in the Chicago area.

Javier Osorio
Javier Osorio is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the University of Notre Dame and is currently a fellow of the Program of Order, Conflict and Violence at Yale University. His main research agenda is focused on disentangling the micro-dynamics behind the onset, escalation and diffusion of drug related violence in Mexico. To analyze these dynamics, he created a geo-referenced database of daily events of drug violence covering all Mexican municipalities between 2000 and 2010. To build this database, Javier co-developed “Eventus ID”, a novel software for automated textual annotation of event data from reports written in Spanish. To conduct his dissertation research, Javier received support from the National Science Foundation, the Social Science Research Council ─ Open Society Foundations, the United States Institute of Peace and the Kellogg Institute for International Studies and The Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation.

Omar García Ponce
Omar García Ponce is a 4th-year Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics at New York University (NYU). His main line of research focuses broadly on the causes and consequences of political violence. More specifically, he studies how exposure to violent conflict shapes social and political behavior. He also has a keen interest in the industrial organization of crime syndicates, with a regional focus on the U.S.-Mexico drug trade. His ongoing research includes collaborative projects with Kanchan Chandra (NYU), Oeindrila Dube (NYU), and Leonard Wantchekon (Princeton).
Vidal Romero

Vidal Romero is a professor in the Political Science Department at the Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM) in Mexico City. For the 2012-13 academic year, he is a visiting professor at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, and Tinker Professor at the Center for Latin American Studies at Stanford University. Romero’s research includes work on presidential decision-making, and crime and violence topics. He has collaborated on different research projects with the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. His current research investigates into citizens’ perceptions of crime and violence and how a climate of insecurity affects individuals’ well-being, their support of crime fighting efforts, and their assessment of authorities’ performance. His work also examines the determinants of violence and the type of relationship between criminal organizations and citizens.

David A. Shirk


Carlos Vilalta

Carlos Vilalta is a professor and researcher at the Center for Economic Research and Education (CIDE) in Mexico City. He examines the spatial and temporal elements of crime and fear of crime. He has been a visiting scholar in the universities of Cambridge, McGill, UNC-Chapel Hill, Washington University in St. Louis, and the University of Houston. He obtained a Ph.D. in Urban Studies from Portland State University and a master degree in Urban Studies from El Colegio de Mexico, and is member of the Mexican National System of Researchers (SNI-2).

Rihan Yeh

Rihan Yeh (University of Chicago, 2009) teaches at the Centro de Estudios Antropológicos of the Colegio de Michoacán in Mexico. Her publications include “Two Publics in a Mexican Border City” (Cultural Anthropology, 2012) and “A Middle-Class Public at Mexico’s Northern Border,” in The Global Middle Classes: Theorizing Through Ethnography (Heiman, Freeman, and Liechty, eds., 2012). She is currently at work on a book manuscript titled “Passing: An Ethnography of Status, Subjectivity and the Public in a Mexican Border City.”
Abstracts and Presentations

“Path Dependence in Development: Evidence from the Mexican Revolution”
Melissa Dell, Harvard University

ABSTRACT: This study exploits within-state variation in drought severity to identify how insurgency during the Mexican Revolution, a major early 20th century armed conflict, impacted subsequent government policies and long-run economic development. Using a novel municipal-level dataset on revolutionary insurgency, the study documents that municipalities experiencing severe drought just prior to the Revolution were substantially more likely to have insurgent activity than municipalities where drought was less severe. Many insurgents demanded land reform, and following the Revolution, Mexico redistributed over half of its surface area in the form of ejidos: farms comprised of individual and communal plots that were granted to a group of petitioners. Rights to ejido plots were non-transferable, renting plots was prohibited, and many decisions about the use of ejido lands had to be countersigned by politicians. Instrumental variables estimates show that municipalities with revolutionary insurgency had 22 percentage points more of their surface area redistributed as ejidos. Today, insurgent municipalities are 20 percentage points more agricultural and 6 percentage points less industrial. Incomes in insurgent municipalities are lower and alternations between political parties for the mayorship have been substantially less common. Overall, the results support a view of history in which relatively modest events can have highly nonlinear and persistent influences, depending on the broader societal circumstances.

“Monitoring Political Brokers: Evidence from Clientelistic Networks in Mexico”
Horracio Larreguy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

PRESENTATION: See below

“Agricultural Shocks, Crime and the Drug Trade in Mexico”
Oeindrila Dube, New York University

ABSTRACT: We study the relationship between trade policy, changes in the price of maize, and the growth of activities related to the drug trade in Mexico. After NAFTA's implementation in 1994, the Mexican maize price dropped sharply and subsequently responded more to fluctuations in the international price. Our evidence suggests that lower maize prices induced farmers to shift from growing maize to illicit drugs. We utilize area of marijuana and poppy fields eradicated by the Mexican government as a proxy for drug crop cultivation. Using municipal data spanning 1990-2010, we document a negative relationship between the maize price and the cultivation of both marijuana and heroin poppies, with larger effects in areas that are climatically more suited to growing maize. We also find that changes in the maize price affected homicide rates disproportionately among corn areas, which points to the violent consequences of an expanding drug sector.
“Choosing between Corruption and Violence: A Survey on Drug-War Violence and Political Behavior in Mexico”
Omar García Ponce, New York University

ABSTRACT: How does fear stemming from violence and lack of state capacity influence attitudes towards corruption? We investigate the effect that fear and exposure to Drug-War violence have on Mexican citizens willingness to make trade-offs between corruption and violence ahead of the 2012 Mexican general election. We conducted two surveys a week apart before the election. First, as part of a nationally represented survey of Mexicans conducted two weeks before the election, we find that fear over violence from the Drug War was positively correlated with greater willingness to accept corruption in exchange for lower levels of violence. To disentangle the causal effects, we conducted a follow-up survey experiment on representative population in Greater Mexico City one week later. We randomly manipulated levels of fear over the Drug War. We find conditional effects. Individuals who have been victims of crimes and received the fear manipulation, are more in favor of reducing corruption, even in the face of increased violence. Our results support a growing body of evidence that suggests that exposure to violence can activate civic engagement and reduce tolerance for poor governance.

“The Spatial Variation of the Initial Conditions of Crime Prevention Programs”
Carlos Vilalta, CIDE

ABSTRACT: Mexico is a good example of how things can get very bad very quickly, among them homicidal violence. The current (2012-2018) federal administration has began reacting intelligently to past administrations errors by making social crime prevention the main anti-crime policy strategy for the sexenio. So far, it has been decided that a total of 2.5 billion pesos are to be distributed across 57 selected urban areas for FY2013. This presentation describes the urban geography of federal spending on crime prevention and intends to estimate what the impact of this spending will be on (1) the levels of community organization against crime and (2) on the levels of criminal victimization, with a particular emphasis on the analysis of the initial conditions of cities, and the magnitude of the local relationships that are intended to be altered by this policy. Using geographically weighted regression (GWR) which is suitable for the diagnosis of spatial heterogeneity, preliminary evidence is found to support the idea that federal spending will increase the levels of community organization against crime as well as decrease household victimization. However, the impact may not be uniform across cities. These preliminary findings not only point out to the validity of “place” as a powerful unit of analysis in public policy, but also reveal that evidence-based spatial analyses can lead to a better understanding of the local impacts of anti-crime policies.

PRESENTATION: See below

“Two Types of Traffic in Tijuana: The Generalization of Accident”
Rihan Yeh, El Colegio de Michoacán

ABSTRACT: This paper re-examines ethnographically the recent wave of violence in the border city of Tijuana, Baja California. First, it explores the recurrent rhetorical gesture whereby the public effects of violence are framed in terms of automotive traffic: primordially, jams caused by shootouts or colgados (corpses hung off of bridges). This gesture suggests that the security crisis in Tijuana needs to be understood not only vis-à-vis the violence per se, but also in relation to broader anxieties around the infrastructural systems of capitalist modernity. Through a series of short oral narratives collected in Tijuana, the paper follows this suggestion through to reveal the emergence of a new concept of “death” as a force running
Motivation

- Long lasting effect of the land redistribution policy after the Mexican Revolution on political clientelism in rural México.

- Political clientelism: the distribution of benefits targeted to individuals or clearly defined groups in exchange for political support.

- Clientelistic networks: networks of voters controlled by local intermediaries - commonly known as political brokers - through which benefits are channeled and votes are delivered.

- This paper: Use of electoral data to monitor the political brokers that operate in communal lands is important for the prevalence of clientelistic practices.
### Distribution Communal Lands in Mexico

- 1917 Constitution established the distribution of land in the form of either ejidos or agrarian communities (communal lands).
- Communal lands account for 50% of agricultural lands in Mexico

### Origin of Clientelistic Networks in Communal Lands

- 1917 Constitution established the "democratically elected" office of the commissariat to administer each communal land.
- Commissariats access and distribute government programs to the peasants in their communities.
- This internal organization facilitated the development of clientelistic networks in communal lands (Sabloff 1981).
- Commissariats became the PRI’s political brokers who trade access to public programs for votes (Baños 1988).

### Situation during Period of Analysis (1994-2010)

- The PRI controls the majority of political brokers in communal lands in the states under its control (MacKinlay 2011).
- The PRI mobilizes its brokers with the funds of the PRI’s states and coordinates them through the National Peasant Confederation (CNC) (Grammont & MacKinlay 2009).
  - CNC brings more than 35% of the PRI’s votes (Reforma 2000)
- The PAN failed attempt to create "Blue CNC" in 2006 (Galicia 2012).
- Cardenist Peasant Central (CCC) - associated to the PRD - has less than 3% of CNC’s affiliates.

### Anecdotal Evidence From Popular Press

- After a flood in the state of Tabasco, the community from the ejido Las Coloradas in the municipality of Cárdenas did not receive any aid since it had historically voted for the PRD (Reforma 2000)
- After another flood in the state of Tabasco, a peasant from the ejido Rafael Martínez de Escobar in the municipality of Huimanguillo complained that the government promised him relief but that the commissariat informed him that "by the instruction of the state government, assistance is only given to PRI supporters" (Marí 2001)
Anecdotal Evidence From Fieldwork

- Fieldwork reflects strong presence of the PRI’s clientelistic networks in states always under the PRI.

PRI State  
Non-PRI State

Agency Problem and Monitoring

- To circumvent the secrecy of the ballot, parties use clientelistic networks.

- Use of clientelistic networks solve agency problem with voters but adds agency problem with brokers.

- Anecdotal evidence suggest that parties use electoral data to monitor their brokers:
  - In India BJP and NCP use polling booth-level data to monitor party workers (Damle 2004)
  - In Mexico the PRI uses electoral section-level data to monitors its brokers operating in *ejidos* and *comunidades agrarias* (Holzner 2003)
  - Chicago’s Daley machine used precinct-level data to monitor precinct captains’ work (Rakove 1975)
Model Set Up

- Clientelistic party competes against non-clientelistic party for votes.
- Clientelistic party uses political brokers for clientelism when incumbent.
- Clientelistic party that uses electoral data to monitor the performance of the brokers that control their networks.

Model Main Elements
- Probabilistic voting model: captures electoral competition problem.
- Principal-agent model: captures agency problem.
- Signal extraction problem.

Overlap Between Clientelistic Networks and Electoral Data

- Party faces a mismatch between
  - the level at which brokers operates their networks, and
  - the level at which electoral data they can use to monitor brokers is disclosed.

- Result: Larger overlap between clientelistic networks and electoral data → better monitoring
  - Larger signal-to-noise ratio.
  - Better information about voters that belong to the network.

Empirical Implications of the Model

- Model predicts that clientelistic networks where there is better monitoring should exhibit
  - a larger electoral support for clientelistic party when it is the incumbent, but
  - the same electoral support for clientelistic party when other party is the incumbent.

- Model predicts that places with more clientelism should exhibit
  - a smaller provision of public goods.

Roadmap

- Historical Background and Anecdotal Evidence
- Motivation and Anecdotal Evidence of Monitoring
- Model Predictions and Intuitions
- **Empirical Strategy and Results**
- Conclusion
To engage in clientelism the PRI needs
- resources to fund political brokers and reward voters, and
- capacity to monitor the performance of its political brokers.

**Measuring Monitoring Capacity**: Exploit variation in the overlap between communal lands and electoral sections.
To engage in clientelism the PRI needs resources to fund political brokers and reward voters, and capacity to monitor the performance of its political brokers.

Measuring Resources: Use changes in the PRI’s control of the state government.
- State governments are responsible for the implementation of the bulk of public programs at the local level (81.5% of local expenditures).
- Incumbency is necessary to manipulate government funds for clientelistic purposes.

### Empirical Strategy

\[ y_{emst} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot I_{PRI}^{st} + \beta_2 \cdot \text{fit}_{ems} + \beta_3 \cdot I_{PRI}^{st} \cdot \text{fit}_{ems} + \epsilon_{emst} \]

- \( y_{emst} \): vote share for the PRI in communal land \( c \) municipality \( m \) in state \( s \) in year \( y \).
- \( I_{PRI}^{st} \): dummy variable that indicates whether the PRI controls the state government at the time of the election.
- \( \text{fit}_{ems} \): fit of communal land.
- \( \epsilon_{emst} \): are clustered at the state level.

**Test:** \( \beta_2 = 0 \) and \( \beta_3 > 0 \).
### Monitoring Results

- Larger fit → larger electoral support for the PRI under PRI governor.

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<td>PRI’s Governor * Fit ($\beta_3$)</td>
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- Municipality fixed effects: Yes
- Electoral Section fixed effects: Yes, Yes
- State - Year Fixed Effects: Yes

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### Municipal-Level Analysis

- So far evidence on how a party monitors its brokers so that they deliver votes from its networks.

- Do clientelism affect aggregate election and policy outcomes? Yes

### Roadmap

- Historical Background and Anecdotal Evidence
- Motivation and Anecdotal Evidence of Monitoring
- Model Predictions and Intuitions
- Empirical Strategy and Results
- Conclusion
Conclusion

- Findings suggest the monitoring over the brokers play an important role for the enforcement of clientelistic transactions.

- Clientelism has aggregate implications on electoral and policy outcomes.

- Results of the paper are more general than the case of clientelistic networks in communal lands in Mexico.
  - Could potentially apply to other clientelistic network operating among groups of individuals located in a narrowly defined geographical area.

Communal Land Fit Distribution

Controls in the Empirical Strategy

\[
y_{c,m,s,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot I_{s,t}^{PRI} + \beta_2 \cdot fit_{c,m,s} + \beta_3 \cdot I_{s,t}^{PRI} \cdot fit_{c,m,s} +
+ \Gamma^t \cdot X_{c,m,s} + \Delta^t \cdot G_{c,m,s} + \eta_m + \phi_t + \epsilon_{c,m,s,t}
\]

- \(X_{c,m,s}\): vector of controls for land area and registered voters of communal land and neighboring sections.
- \(G_{c,m,s}\): vector of controls for spatial location of communal land.
- \(\eta_m\) and \(\phi_t\): municipality (communal land) and time fixed effects.

Data

- Data at the electoral section and the municipal level for all municipal elections from 1991 to 2010.
  - State electoral institutes, Alain de Remes and BANAMEX-CIDAC electoral data bases.
  - Geospatial data on the location of the communal lands
    - Agrarian National Registry (RAN)’s PROCEDE.
  - Geospatial data on the location of electoral sections
    - Federal Electoral Institute (IFE)
  - Other regressors of interest and policy outcomes from the 2007 Agricultural Census, several Population Censuses (1990 to 2010), and the State and Municipal Data Base System (1994-2010)
    - National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI).
**Monitoring Results: Placebo**

- Larger fit ⇝ larger electoral support for the PRI.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>(2)</th>
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| Mean Outcome               | 0.5044 | .5044 | 0.5044 | .5044 |
| Mean Fit                   | 0.4236 | .4236 | 0.4236 | .4236 |
| Standard Deviation Fit     | 0.2115 | .2115 | 0.2115 | .2115 |
| Observations               | 133730 | 133730 | 133730 | 133730 |
| R-squared                  | 0.2824 | .2813 | 0.3467 | .3467 |

**Empirical Strategy of Municipal-Level Analysis**

\[
y_{m,s,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot I_{PRI}^{s,t} + \beta_2 \cdot I_{PRI}^{s,t} \cdot a_{m,s} + \beta_3 \cdot I_{PRI}^{s,t} \cdot c_{m,s} + c_{l,m,s} + \eta_{m,s,t} + \epsilon_{m,s,t}
\]

- \( y_{m,s,t} \rightarrow \) vote share for the PRI in municipality \( m \) in state \( s \) in year \( t \).
- \( I_{PRI}^{s,t} \) is a dummy variable that indicates whether the PRI controls the state government at the time of the election.
- \( c_{l,m,s}, a_{m,s} \rightarrow \) share of municipal communal and agricultural land.
- \( \epsilon_{m,s,t} \) are clustered at the state level.

- **Test:** \( \beta_2 > 0 \) for election results and \( \beta_2 < 0 \) for public goods.

**Preview of Results on Election Outcomes**

- Vote Share for the PRI (y axis) and Election Since Change from the PRI in State Government (x axis).

**Election Outcomes**

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<tr>
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<td>.061</td>
<td>.1409***</td>
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### Policy Outcomes

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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Effect

- Municipality and Year Fixed Effects: Yes
- State - Year Fixed Effects: Yes
- Mean Outcome: 1.276, 8.343, 191.6
- Mean Communal Land: 0.234, 0.2339, 0.2334
- Standard Deviation Communal Land: 0.1894, 0.1892, 0.1891
- Mean Agricultural Land: 0.5272, 0.5272, 0.5264
- Standard Deviation Land: 0.2861, 0.2857, 0.2862
- Observations: 32663, 32781, 33015
- R - squared: 0.9807, 0.9111, 0.8018

### Placebo with Municipal Incumbency

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<tr>
<td>Communal Land * PRI's Mayor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agricultural Land * PRI's Mayor</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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Effect

- Municipality and Year Fixed Effects: Yes
- State - Year Fixed Effects: Yes
- Mean Outcome: 0.5409, 0.5409, 0.5407
- Mean Communal Land: 0.2333, 0.2333, 0.2331
- Standard Deviation Communal Land: 0.1846, 0.1846, 0.1846
- Mean Agricultural Land: 0.5248, 0.5248, 0.525
- Standard Deviation Land: 0.2837, 0.2837, 0.2837
- Observations: 13822, 13822, 13779
- R - squared: 0.5648, 0.6608, 0.6674
### Policy Outcomes With State-Year Fixed Effects

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<th>Students</th>
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### Policy Outcomes With Controls

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### Policy Outcomes Placebo

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### Policy Outcomes With Placebo

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The spatial variation of the initial conditions of crime prevention programs

Preliminary findings

This presentation
• I’d like to communicate 3 ideas:
  – Place matters
    • It structures the way we behave (Pred, 1990)
      – Criminal behavior is place-specific
    • Local context vs. compositional effects
  – If place matters we cannot expect same (crime prevention) policy effects across places
  – We tend to think/invest based on the magnitude of the problem but not in terms of the relationships we intend to affect
• And present 2 bivariate correlations

Premises and evidence
• People in places are different
  – Contextual vs compositional conception of place
  – Location + material form + meaning and value (Gyerin, 2000)
  – Networks of social relations (Massey, 1994)
• We know that...
  – Criminal activity concentrates: clustering and behavioral contagion
  – Relationships are spatially variable: spatial regimes
    • Different in degree (magnitude: Local R²)
    • Different in type (magnitude and sign of the slope: +/-)
    • And also in the initial conditions (mag. and sign of the intercept: +/-)
  – The omitted-variable bias (biased coefficients + inflated SEs)

A simple example of spatial variability
• Murder and youth unemployment (OECD, 2012):
  Where the problem is concentrated = more frequent
  Where the relationship is stronger
Spatiality: Methodological implications

- Spatial data require spatial methods
- Spatiality and OLS:
  - Places/observations are not independent
  - Spatial autocorrelation:
    - Heteroskedasticity → unreliable significance tests
  - Spatial heterogeneity:
    - Biased estimates (as different relationships in different places will cancel each other out in the calculation of the estimates)
    - Local models ≠ National model
- Spatial modeling:
  - Spatial autocorrelation:
    - Odland (1988) and Anselin (1993): Spatial autoregressive modeling
  - Spatial heterogeneity:
    - Brunsdon et al. (1996): Geographically weighted regression (GWR)

What is GWR?

- An extension of OLS (Fotheringham et al. 2002):
  \[ y_i = \beta_0 + \sum_k \beta_k x_{ik} + \varepsilon_i \]
  \[ y_i = \beta_0(u_i, v_i) + \sum_k \beta_k(u_i, v_i)x_{ik} + \varepsilon_i \]
- GWR allows for changes in the reg. coefficients across the area
- GWR: Local estimates = Local equations = Test models in all places
- Underlying logic = Weighted least squares regression
  - Assumes sphere of influence around places and uses it to test for relationships
  - For each place data is weighted differently so that results are unique to each place
  - First Law of Geography = Assigns more influence or “weight” to closer vs. farther places
  - Uses a weighting function with a specified bandwidth (i.e. radius)
    - Distance decay function

Crime prevention policy for 2013-2018

- Nothing new really, but now it “seems” it is for real
  - NDP (1989-1994) and from then on but all rhetoric...
- What is being planned?
  - National Crime Prevention Program:
    - Input: Social crime prevention / citizen participation and community cohesion
    - Output: To “correct the environmental conditions of crime” and “risk factors of violence”
- What has been done so far?
  - Assign a budget: 2.5 billion pesos for FY2013
  - Select places: 48 municipalities + 2 delegaciones + 7 Metro areas
    - Criteria: Homicide counts and Pop. size in 2010

Geography of expenditure for crime prevention for FY2013

1 Standard distance: 68% of expenditure within a 1,577 kms radio
Source: Own based on DOF of February 15th of 2013
Q&A: Maps and tables ahead

- Will this federal spending impact community organization for crime prevention purposes?
  - Similarly across places?
- Will federal spending impact criminal victimization?
  - Also similarly across places?

My first shot to answer the questions...

% of HH Organized in Community for Crime Prevention and Victimization Rates were regressed on Expenditure in Crime Prevention

Impact on Community Organization (Local $R^2$)

1 Standard distance: 68% of impact within a 2,248 kms radio

Source: Own based on ENVIPE-INEGI, 2011

Community Organization for CrPrev - 2010

Source: Own based on ENVIPE-INEGI, 2011

HH Victimization - 2010
Next steps

- Q: If (effects of CrimPrev expenditure on) places seem to differ, how exactly do they differ?
  - In what way exactly?
  - How much?
    - And how if federal spending returns are zero?
- Model misspecification?
  - **We actually need a descriptive model of the DV...**
  - Model Comm. Org. for Crime Prevention:
      - Trust in local police (-), level of schooling (+), reports of theft (+) and kidnapping crimes (+) in the neighbourhood
  - Model of victimization
    - Mexico, Mexico City, and state of Campeche profiles of victims

---

GWR for both DV

- Comparison and the almost self-evident need for a descriptive model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Community Organization</th>
<th>Victimization</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global R2</td>
<td>GWR Adaptive</td>
<td>GWR Adaptive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residuals:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Normality (KS)</td>
<td>29.640 (p &lt; 0.001)</td>
<td>31.892 (p &lt; 0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heteroskedasticity (Koenker BP)</td>
<td>484.245 (p &lt; 0.001)</td>
<td>289.546 (p &lt; 0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial autocorrelation (Moran’s I)</td>
<td>-0.001 (p = 0.192)</td>
<td>-0.002 (p = 0.102)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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¡Gracias!

Any suggestions?

[www.geocrimen.cide.edu](http://www.geocrimen.cide.edu)
carlos.vilalta@cide.edu